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Abstract   
In light of sluggish progress in developing renewable energy generation in Kazakhstan, this 
paper aims to investigate the perceptions and opinions of actors in the field regarding policy 
design and effectiveness of governance for renewables. Known for its vast natural resources 
including oil, gas, and coal, Kazakhstan has been using fossil fuels as a principal driver of its 
economy since 1991, when it gained the status of an independent nation. While policy on 
renewables and governance has been institutionalised since 2006, progress has been slow. 
Based on the data from in-depth interviews, the study identified that actors viewed policy 
design as a preliminary, although necessary, stage, subject to adjustments. The investors were 
concerned with multiple gaps and inconsistencies in the governance structure, and many 
walked away. The paper concludes that the use of active power of central government 
appeared insufficient for delivering results in policy design and governance. Making changes 
to its policy and governance, the government also needs to use its agenda-setting and 
preference-shaping power to ensure the engagement of investors, interest groups, local 
communities, and consumers for increasing renewable energy generation.   
      







An ex-Soviet nation in Central Asia, Kazakhstan is famous for its immense natural resources, 
including oil, gas, uranium, and coal. Relying for many years on its extractive industries, 
Kazakhstan has shown steady economic growth since 1991, when it became an independent 
country. The oil sector has been serving as a critical driver of growth and the principal source 
of government revenue. The nation’s exports of oil, gas, and by-products represented 21% of 
GDP in 2018 (World Bank, 2019) and 67% of exports in 2019 (Trading Economics, 2020), 
which demonstrates the nation’s significant dependency on the sale of its natural resources. In 
the neighbouring Russia (also a resource-rich country), oil and gas revenue is estimated to 
form 29.3% of the national budget in 2020 (Vzglyad, 2020), while fossil fuels represent 13% 
of GDP and 61% of exports in 2019 (Ruzhinskya and Nazarova, 2020).   
 
Despite the large volume of oil, gas, and coal reserves in Kazakhstan, there is an ongoing 
discussion of the nation’s energy security, which occasionally intensifies (Koulouri and 
Mouraviev, 2019). Much of this discussion focuses on the political dimension of energy 
security and the need to use oil revenue to restructure the economy; while the other side of 
the debate highlights opportunities to develop energy generation from renewable sources. 
While it would be incorrect to argue that the government experienced strong pressure to 
promote renewables, significant work has been done to adopt policy on renewable energy 
generation, and create legislative and institutional frameworks for policy implementation. 
This work has taken a number of years, from the mid-2000s to the present time, and there is a 




After more than ten years of policy implementation with incomplete and evolving governance 
structure, the proportion of energy from renewable sources remains very small and progress 
is minimal. In 2018, the share of energy from fossil fuels in Kazakhstan was 81.3%, hydro 
9.7%, gas turbine  8.5%, and solar, wind, and bio energy 0.5% (KEGOC, 2019). Kazakhstan 
is often noted as an authoritarian state (e.g. see Fauve, 2015; Furstenberg, 2018), which 
means, among other features, that it has high administrative capacity to implement the 
government-set agenda. Nonetheless, in the case of renewables, the development was slow. It 
is unlikely that the dominance of the oil sector could be used as a single all-embracing 
explanation for the lack of progress in renewable energy generation. Although the oil sector’s 
dominance in Kazakhstan could be observed, the government was able to shape its policy on 
renewables, pass relevant laws and regulations, and create institutional framework, showing a 
clear attempt to align the nation with industrialised world economies. This effort is evidenced 
by the Kazakhstan-2050 strategy (Nazarbayev, 2012). While renewables policy and 
governance have been institutionalised since 2006, the reasons why they have been 
ineffectual need to be identified. 
        
In light of sluggish progress in developing renewable energy generation in Kazakhstan, this 
paper’s aim is to investigate the perceptions and opinions of actors in the field regarding 
policy design and effectiveness of governance for renewables. This paper intends to answer 
the following research questions: 
1. How do actors perceive effectiveness of the renewable energy policy framework in 
Kazakhstan?                                               
2. How do actors perceive effectiveness of governance for renewable energy generation? 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the research methodology, how data 
were received and analysed. Section 3 presents findings from the research, organised into 
three themes, while Section 4 offers a discussion of these findings. Section 5 draws 
conclusions and identifies policy implications.  
      
2. Methodology 
For this qualitative study, data were collected by in-depth interviews, conducted in 2018–19, 
and content analysis of documents relevant to the promotion of renewables, which include 
Kazakhstan’s laws, nationwide programmes, regional and local guidelines, and instructions 
for investors and other actors in the renewables field. Conducting 21 interviews with 
participants at different levels (national, regional, and local) captured varying perspectives 
within a range of actors on different aspects of renewables policy and its implementation. The 
interviews were semi-structured, guided by a topic list, so that data were collected 
consistently across the whole sample. The criteria for selecting a participant for the study 
were her/his expertise in the renewables field; knowledge of the laws, regulations, and other 
documents, and how they work (or not) in practice. In the interviews, the emphasis was on 
how the expectations regarding policy design and/or governance compared to the actual 
outcomes of policy and implementation, from the interviewee’s perspective. The interviews 
were carried out in Russian, taking advantage of the researcher’s native language skills. Some 
interviews were also conducted in Russian by the researcher’s counterparts who reside in 
Kazakhstan. The length of the interviews varied from 30 minutes to an hour. 
 
The interviewees included three mid-level staff working for national government 
organisations; two independent advisers with expertise in the field; five staff from regional 
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and local governments; four private investors; five academics working at Kazakhstan’s 
universities; and two activists working for non-governmental organisations (NGOs).    
 
A relatively small sample size has nonetheless allowed the data to reach saturation, meaning 
that by the end of data collection it became clear to the researcher that more data would likely 
elicit no new findings. The interview data, complemented by document analysis, therefore 
provided for data triangulation by gaining a solid understanding of policy and governance on 
renewables from different perspectives. By increasing the level of knowledge via the use of 
more than one method to understand the phenomena, the study’s validity was assured.  
 
Data were structured by the themes and thematic analysis was performed, giving 
consideration to different opinions and perceptions within each theme. This allowed trends 
and patterns to be identified in how the promotion of renewable energy has developed in 
Kazakhstan.    
     
The study complied with the requirements for ethics in research. Prior to interviewing, the 
participants were informed that their participation was entirely voluntary and that they could 
refuse to take part, or terminate the interview, at any point if they so wished. As not every 
person in Kazakhstan, particularly government employees, is prepared to share their views on 
public policy and government actions, matters of confidentiality and anonymity were of 
critical importance for engaging participants in this study. Participants were assured that their 
identity would remain confidential; that their name, organisation, and other identifiable 
information would not be linked to the data obtained; and that anonymity would be ensured 




3. Results  
Three themes emerged from the interview data, around which this section has been 
structured: the design of a policy framework for renewable energy generation; governance 
arrangements for renewables, which reflect the national government’s perspective; and the 
private investor’s perspective on the governance arrangements. The study participants 
provided their assessment of how policy was rolled out and how governance arrangements 
were made by expressing their views, opinions, and perceptions. Findings in each theme are 
reported below.      
 
3.1 Theme 1: Design of a policy framework for renewables 
Interviewees were asked to comment on the need to create a policy framework for the 
promotion of renewable energy and the timeliness of government actions. The study 
participants overwhelmingly supported, and even praised, the government’s efforts to design 
policy that would ensure promotion of renewable energy within the nation. Interviewees 
emphasised that the government policy was rolled out over more than ten years, beginning 
with policy adoption in 2006, the Concept of transition to sustainable development (Decree of 
the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Concept of transition of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan to sustainable development, 2006). Three years later the concept materialised, at 
least in part, in the Law on supporting the use of renewables, adopted in 2009, with 
amendments in 2013 – a key piece of legislation that set Kazakhstan’s legal framework for 
renewables (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Support of the Use of Renewable 
Energy Sources’, 2009). Yet another document, of even greater importance, is the 
Kazakhstan-2050 strategy (Nazarbayev, 2012), which put forward an ambitious goal for the 
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nation to become one of the 30 most developed economies in the world by 2050. The 
interviewees underlined that this strategy became a guiding framework for the whole country 
and throughout all levels of government, and would continue to serve as a principal steering 
force for years to come. As Kazakhstan-2050 had set the nation’s strategic priorities, one of 
which is to increase renewable energy generation, effectively the document serves and will 
continue to serve as an overarching (and undisputed) long-term policy framework.  
 
The study participants pointed out a direct link between the Kazakhstan-2050 strategy and 
other documents focusing on renewables, which confirms, in the interviewees’ opinions, that 
increasing renewable energy generation has been successfully embedded in policy making. 
Moreover, more specific regulations and other documents exemplify continuous 
implementation of the renewables policy, noting as proof the ‘green economy’ concept that 
was approved by the government in 2013 (Decree of the President of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan on the Concept of transition of the Republic of Kazakhstan to ‘green economy’, 
2013) and generally aligns with the law on renewables, which was amended the same year.  
 
An interviewee provided the following evaluation of the government’s work for setting the 
policy framework for renewables:  
Kazakhstan’s dependence on oil is well known. The oil sector is very large and 
powerful, its leaders are prominent and influential people. A few years ago, I 
wouldn’t even have imagined that someone would be seriously talking about 
renewable energy, why does the country need it? But the government was surprisingly 
very quick in adopting the law and regulations on renewables, which tells me that 
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there is an understanding in the government circles that our future is with renewable 
energy, not oil. 
 (Interviewee 4) 
This is echoed by another study participant:  
I was surprised, and also pleased, when I saw the law on renewables approved without 
any difficulties. I don’t think that those who work in the oil sector or, in fact, most 
people expected that this law would ever become a reality. The vast majority of the 
population are convinced that we have oil and coal reserves for hundreds of years. 
This is true, reserves are huge. 
 (Interviewee 11)  
Another participant commented as follows:  
When my colleagues and I found out about this law [law on renewables], we 
discussed and even made some jokes, saying: ‘Who needs to generate this renewable 
energy? Who will be the consumers if energy from coal, gas, and oil is there, and the 
energy system works quite well?’ We thought perhaps some farmers in remote 
villages might be interested in renewable energy, and that’s about it. But as years have 
passed, it looks like the interest in renewable energy generation and consumption is 
growing. So, the government did the right thing when it adopted the law years ago.  
(Interviewee 7)  
Another opinion was even more optimistic:  
It was a very smart move by the government to go ahead with the law on renewables 
and other legislation in this field. We need to cut or at least significantly reduce the 
economy’s dependence on oil. Look what happens when the oil price goes down. The 
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budget is truly suffering, and the dollar–tenge [tenge is Kazakhstan’s national 
currency] exchange rate goes up very quickly. We have seen this a few times in the 
past. It is great that some government officials started thinking about renewables as an 
alternative to fossil fuels.  
(Interviewee 16) 
 
One participant emphasised the detrimental impact that the oil sector exerts, in his/her 
opinion, on other sectors, particularly on renewable energy generation.  
Of course, oil brings a lot of money to the country. But at the same time, the large size 
of the oil sector does not allow other industries to develop. They remain small or even 
non-existent. And the renewable energy sector is one of them. I know that some in the 
government still raise the question – why do we need to develop renewable energy if 
it is not going to bring any money? 
(Interviewee 6)        
When asked about how successful the policy design was and currently is, study participants 
overwhelmingly agreed that the adopted law and related procedures and regulations are just 
the first step in promoting renewables, and a large number of inconsistencies and gaps exist. 
“In the very first law on renewables it is impossible to properly set all required terms and 
conditions. I’m sure in a few years a new, more comprehensive law will be developed and it 
will reflect the lessons learned” (Interviewee 19). This was confirmed by another comment: 
“We are clearly at the beginning stage. People, the business community, and politicians need 
time to warm up to the idea that renewable energy is a realistic possibility, and it is an 
alternative to energy from oil. Development at the initial stage is slow but this was 
inevitable” (Interviewee 9). Some respondents were even more optimistic: “I’m glad we have 
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passed the starting point. And the government should be praised for that. I expect a lot faster 
progress with renewable energy in the near future” (Interviewee 2). Although policy adoption 
was deemed timely by all interviewees, their assessment focused on timeliness, rather than on 
evaluating particular elements of policy design. They viewed policy design as an initial step, 
for which there were no particular requirements. Without critically assessing policy design 
and the extent to which it was complete and successful, interviewees switched the focus of 
their comments to governance, which formed the content of the next two themes. It emerged 
from the interviews that study participants viewed governance differently – from the national 
government’s perspective and from the investors’ perspective.                 
   
3.2 Theme 2: Governance arrangements for renewables – the national government’s 
perspective 
Many interviewees (about a half) were convinced that the national government’s was the only 
legitimate perspective, as it shows what the government wanted to achieve in the renewables 
field and how its vision materialised. These governance arrangements are nationwide 
conditions for policy implementation. They were devised between 2009 and 2018, based on 
high-level considerations of what was then required, from the national government’s 
perspective, to ensure the flow of new private investment into renewable energy generation. 
Interviewees reported that the private investors’ perspective was simply not there as no one 
represented the investors’ views.  
 
The study participants noted a large number of problems and gaps in governance, including 
unclear overall governance structure; overlapping areas of responsibility of various 
government organisations and, as a result, insufficient accountability; vagueness of 
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government’s own instructions and procedures regarding the process of review of the 
proposed renewables projects; a large degree of discretion in decision-making given to some 
agencies, increasing the risk of error and/or corruption; and failure to set effective incentives 
to agencies responsible for the development of renewable energy infrastructure and power 
generation facilities. The following comment illustrates some problems relating to the 
governance structure: “It seems the government was unsure who should be responsible for 
what, and therefore they assigned two or more departments and agencies to work together in 
a certain field, but this instantly created a chaotic situation with unclear ultimate 
responsibility” (Interviewee 5).    
      
A few respondents emphasised a disconnect between the laws and effective regulatory 
framework. This is exemplified by the following excerpt:  
Some, in fact, quite a few provisions of the laws are great but regional governments 
and their agencies need clear procedures on how to consider investment projects, how 
to finance them. For example, can they grant land for the construction of a private 
energy facility or should they charge the market price for this land? Some legal 
provisions were not supported by regulations. To be exact, some regulations did not 
exist, and in this situation regional agencies were reluctant to make own decisions.  
(Interviewee 11) 
 
The note about reluctance to make decisions regarding investment projects overlaps with the 
large degree of discretionary decision-making powers given to some organisations. Although 
it is likely that the original intent was to provide flexibility in decisions, which should have 
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allowed for local and regional contexts to be integrated, the result appeared to be different: it 
brought about a shirking of responsibility. An interviewee commented:  
I’m aware of many renewables projects that got stuck waiting for approvals. It 
became clear that some officials were really afraid of making any decision, perhaps 
because of the risk of being penalised. Of course, private companies were puzzled 
with these lengthy delays. They were asking: do you really want us to invest in 
renewable energy or not?  
(Interviewee 3)  
 
Responsibility avoidance was linked, at least in part, to the lack of incentive for government 
officials to actively promote development of renewable energy generation.  
For a few years it appeared that not many people in the government were interested in 
setting up energy generating facilities by the private companies. Companies need land 
to set up the facilities, and giving them land was problematic in itself. Then there are 
unclear procedures regarding how to connect facilities to the national grid. Then there 
are problems with feed-in tariffs – what if investors are unhappy with the tariff and 
walk away in the middle of the process? The officials, particularly in the regions, 
were probably concerned with why they need to do anything at all to develop 
renewables. The bottom line was, and still is for many, what benefit will renewables 
bring to the local or regional economy?  




No targets were set for the regions and central agencies regarding developing energy 
generation from renewables. Naturally, for the national government it was difficult to foresee 
which targets might be realistic at a time when the governance structure and processes were 
in the early days of their formation. However, it appeared that some officials and managers 
viewed this situation as an opportunity to opt out from any decisions that they perceived as 
risk-bearing. An interviewee argued that, “when there were no specific targets about 
launching at least a minimum number of renewables projects, for some officials it was a 
signal that doing nothing was totally appropriate” (Interviewee 13). This was echoed by 
another comment:  
We witnessed an overcautious approach to selecting and granting approvals for the 
projects. This is understandable – for example, if a regional government was not 
assigned a task to generate a certain volume of renewable energy, why would they 
bother to even consider any risk related to a project? It is a safe bet to ask for 
additional documentation, postpone the decision, then postpone again. 
         (Interviewee 6)     
           
The prevailing opinion about governance arrangements can be characterised by blending two 
viewpoints. The first was the deeply embedded belief that governance during the period 
2009–19 should be assessed as temporary and incomplete due to the novelty of renewables in 
Kazakhstan, and there was, therefore, no expectation of making it 100% effective. The 
second viewpoint was that the incomplete governance arrangements backfired: as the 
governance structure appeared ineffective and some critical procedures were vaguely defined 
or lacking (e.g. how to connect a facility to the grid or what financing sources were 
available), the government could not make any tangible progress in promoting renewables, 
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and the proportion of energy from renewable sources over the ten-year period remains very 
small. In contrast, in other countries, such as Brazil and Spain, making governance 
arrangements included target setting, offering incentives to energy producers, creating feed-
in-tariffs, releasing official guidance for investors, and conducting a promotional campaign 
(Dinica, 2008; Dutra and Szklo, 2008). 
 
3.3 Theme 3: Governance arrangements for renewables – the private investors’ perspective 
As interviews showed that the progress with promoting renewables stalled, without any 
significant, large-scale projects underway, another theme emerged from the comments of the 
study participants that focused on how the investors viewed governance. Specifically, 
interviewees discussed what impediments the investors faced and what concerns they had 
regarding the overall process – such as applying for a permit, setting up an energy-generating 
facility, construction, and supplying electrical power to the grid and receiving the payment. 
They emphasised three main areas of concern: a lack of opportunities for long-term 
borrowing to finance a project; a lack of credibility of the Financial Settlement Centre (FSC) 
that was assigned the role of a central agency responsible for payments to the energy 
producers; and uncertainty and a lack of clarity regarding the process, that is, what part of the 
government is responsible for what, and how long the investment process (until payments for 
renewable energy begin to flow in) might take.    
 
Regarding long-term financing, the interviewees reported the commonly shared opinion 
among investors that, as energy generation from renewables was a new undertaking for 
Kazakhstan, the government should have supported this venture with financial instruments, 
such as low-interest loans, financing opportunities by so-called green bonds and/or special 
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arrangements with government investment banks or commercial banks. However, there were 
no specially designed financing opportunities. “Investors were on their own as far as 
financing was concerned. Either they should have used their own funds or got a loan from a 
bank. But uncertainty about when cash for renewable energy might begin flowing in 
prevented many from receiving a loan” (Interviewee 18).           
 
To support transactions and payments in the renewable energy field, in 2013 Kazakhstan’s 
government formed the FSC, which became an important part of the governance structure for 
renewables. The FSC was charged with the responsibility of carrying out the centralised 
purchase and sale of electrical power produced from renewable sources and to supply that 
energy to Kazakhstan’s power system. However, for at least five years, from 2013 to about 
2018, the investors were sceptical about the FSC’s ability to pay, as it remained unclear what 
funds are available to the FSC. The controversy regarding the FSC’s role was, in part, created 
by the 2009 law on renewable energy, which stipulated that energy producers are required to 
purchase all energy from renewable sources indirectly, through the FSC, rather than directly. 
An interviewee revealed that,  
an organisation was formed but all we [the investors] knew was that it would be 
buying the energy. There were no details regarding how much money the government 
gave the FSC or where the centre would get the money. What if it runs out of money 
and tells us [the energy suppliers] to wait until the next budget cycle?  
(Interviewee 16) 
Lack of confidence in the FSC’s role was echoed by another study participant:  
I think it was a mistake that the role of the FSC was not properly explained and 
communicated to the business community. The government just made a decision to 
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create this centre and then it was set up. But how was it going to work? How could we 
make sure that it truly has capacity to pay? Much uncertainty around this centre in its 
first few years of existence turned many investors away. Investors’ thinking is 
straightforward: they need to get paid for the energy they supply. If this is uncertain, 
they walk away.   
(Interviewee 11)  
 
Governance arrangements were subject to sharp criticism in relation to the clarity and length 
of the investment process. The application procedure for receiving land on which to construct 
a facility was perceived by investors as complicated and contradictory and far from 
streamlined. In particular, the regional, rather than local, authorities were given the privilege 
to grant land plots for the purpose of constructing energy-generating facilities that use 
renewable sources, as per amended Article 90 of the Land Code (2003). However, the 
procedure and criteria based on which the regional governments were expected to make their 
decisions were unclear to the investors (Interviewees 2, 16, 21). It also appeared that at this 
stage of the investment process companies faced significant delays, waiting many months for 
a decision. For example, following the procedure for receiving land (to be used for building a 
facility) requires at least three and a half months for completing four out of ten sub-stages, 
while the timeline is not set for the remaining six sub-stages, all these leading to the lengthy 
waiting time (Koulouri and Mouraviev, 2018). Furthermore, investors were uncertain about 
the role of the local authorities, that is, whether they need to facilitate investment in 
renewables or can remain disengaged.    
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Another part of process-related governance concerned arrangements for connecting energy-
generating facilities to the grid. This task was assigned to the regional power transmission 
companies, although the timeframe for connecting was unclear and the interviewees (and 
investors) were unaware of whether investors could apply for compensation from the 
transmission companies in case of a delay. This uncertainty was a serious concern for the 
investors. An interviewee commented:  
I stayed in touch with a few investors for a couple of years. I could clearly see their 
rapidly growing frustration with the process and lack of clarity about many 
procedures. In one conversation an investor shared with me his talk with someone in 
the regional agency when he [the investor] was trying to understand how quickly his 
facility can be connected to the grid. And he could not get an answer… For a 
businessman, it was unbelievable. It was very frustrating.  
(Interviewee 3)      
 
Clarity in the overall process of launching a facility – from expressing initial interest to 
generating energy – was a deep concern for the vast majority of private investors. Although 
the process was driven by the law on renewables and other legislation, studying all normative 
(i.e. prescriptive) documents was overwhelming for most investors.  
I first developed my interest in setting up a solar energy facility in 2011. However, I 
quickly got lost while reading the laws, government programmes, and instructions. I 
saw some contradictions, I couldn’t find answers to my questions, and of course I 
gave up. Then, when a guide for investors was released, I took it as an excellent step 
forward – it showed what an investor should go through, although there were still 
quite a few gaps. 
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 (Interviewee 6) 
 
The guide for investors mentioned here is for those interested in launching an energy-
generating facility from renewable sources, and was published for Kazakhstan in 2015 by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC, 2015). The guide was prepared in collaboration with 
the Ministry of Energy and the Clean Technology Fund and explains the stages an investor 
has to go through, with sub-stages, agencies involved, and the estimated time required for 
completing each stage. The guide shows that an investor has to complete at least nine stages 
including at least 40 sub-stages (Koulouri and Mouraviev, 2018). The number of agencies 
involved in each stage ranged from one to five, while the time involved in completing most 
of sub-stages was unspecified (Koulouri and Mouraviev, 2018). This ambiguity was 
confirmed by many interviewees’ comments, such as: “A guide for investors was helpful but 
only to a degree, lots of things remained unclear. Moreover, after I looked through the guide I 
thought: do I really need to go through all this bureaucracy? What for? There are other 
opportunities for investment” (Interviewee 12).  
 
To summarise, although the investors welcomed the guide, they were still deeply concerned 
with the process, as the guide does not cover the gaps in the governance arrangements. These 
gaps could be described as the lack of clarity in the investment process  (regarding stages, 
sub-stages, timeframe, regulations, or lack thereof) and significant bureaucratic discretion in 
relation to a vast range of decisions, due to which many investors during that time (around 
2010–18) walked away from the prospect of building a facility that would generate energy 
from renewable sources. There was a general agreement among interviewees that a 
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substantial number of investors walked away as a result of these barriers, with some 
interviewees estimating the number of discouraged investors to be a few hundred.                    
  
4. Discussion 
This section discusses the findings in each theme. In the first theme (design of policy 
framework), the interviewees’ opinions emphasised three principal features: (a) the 
government took an active role in putting forward an initiative of adopting policy on 
renewables, without any significant pressure from the interest groups; (b) policy design 
should be viewed as initial, temporary, and experimental until the government learns from its 
own experience; and therefore (c) there was no expectation that policy design should 
necessarily have been successful. Owing to the low expectations, the interviewees’ 
assessment of the government’s achievements in policy design was mostly positive. They 
praised the mere fact that, in a country with abundant fossil fuels (and no apparent need for 
energy from renewable sources), the government’s power was used, in their opinion, as an 
intentional force to break the economy’s long-lasting dependency on oil, gas, and coal. 
However, the interviewees’ laudatory remarks contain an implicit contradiction: while the 
government’s effort to launch a policy on renewables was viewed as a manifestation of 
intentional and active power (Lukes, 2005), there was limited or no criticism that the same 
intentional and active power effectively created the nation’s dependency on oil since 
Kazakhstan gained its independence in 1991, and this dependency continues to date.     
             
In themes 2 and 3, the interviewees offered a large number of critical comments, pointing to 
many unfavorable governance arrangements for renewable energy. The interviewees reported 
a clear mismatch between government’s expectations regarding how governance should be 
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put in place, on the one hand, and investors’ expectations of how their investment process 
should be facilitated, on the other. When asked about the government’s rationale for setting 
certain aspects of governance, the interviewees’ opinions were somewhat appreciative in a 
sense of acknowledging some (limited) progress, although – importantly – the results have 
not yet been achieved. While interviewees welcomed the government’s efforts to put in place 
arrangements to promote renewable energy, they noted a broad range of discrepancies, gaps 
and outstanding problems and expressed their criticism of the incomplete governance 
structure that was not operational for the most part and, therefore, did not allow to attract 
investment. When asked about the investors’ perspective – that is, how they understand 
governance and the investment process – the interviewees provided a rather disadvantageous 
picture, showing a large number of inconsistencies and gaps in the arrangements. The 
interviewees emphasised multiple times that, owing to these irregularities, many investors 
walked away and lost their interest in renewable energy generation. The bottom line is 
whether renewable energy generation was/is increasing or not, because governance 
arrangements should be effective in achieving the policy goals. As numbers show that, to 
date, the proportion of renewable energy (solar, wind, and biofuels) remains below 1%. 
Furthermore, although the trajectory shows a relatively small increase of solar, wind and 
biofuels (see Table 1), this did not change the structure of the energy mix, and, therefore, it is 
hardly possible to positively assess the effectiveness of governance.  
                                               < Insert Table 1 about here > 
Table 2 summarises the characteristics of each theme and shows a perspective adopted by a 
majority of interviewees within a certain theme. 
 




As Table 2 shows, the existing gaps in the policy framework might indicate a lack of 
government’s preparedness or lack of action. The gaps might also be explained by a cautious 
and relatively slow approach to building governance for renewables in order to avoid or 
minimise mistakes. 
            
In the second theme that describes the government’s perspective while it was building the 
governance structure, the government showed an intent to exert influence on the investors 
and society at large by setting an agenda to promote renewables. However, the study showed 
that this influence appeared quite limited because the need for renewable energy in 
Kazakhstan has not yet become a commonly accepted idea, and examples of fast and 
effective investment in renewables are hard to find.  
 
The government’s limited impact on society and specifically on investors is also shown in the 
third theme, which captures the investors’ perceptions of and opinions regarding governance 
for renewables. It is worth emphasising a lack of effective arrangements to facilitate private 
investment in renewables, which remained very small. In other words, business people’s 
willingness to invest in renewable energy has yet to strengthen. One of the critical reasons for 
this was an acute lack of incentive for both government officials and investors to launch 
renewable energy facilities. Furthermore, customers’ preference to receive energy from 
renewable sources, rather than fossil fuels, was and still is virtually non-existent in 
Kazakhstan. The notes about barriers to investing in renewable energy are aligned with the 
findings of other researchers. For example, assessing various options for energy investment in 
Kazakhstan, MacGregor (2017) argues that ‘renewable energy is often considered a clear win 
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for energy security and global environmental and social values, but our findings provide little 
support for this in Kazakhstan's case. Both financially and economically, we find limited 
evidence on which to base a recommendation to pursue renewable energy’ (p. 221). 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
Kazakhstan’s policy on renewable energy has been developing for about 15 years, since the 
mid-2000s. The first 10 to 12 years may be viewed as an initial stage, which is naturally 
characterised by novel requirements in many fields including designing key elements of 
policy, setting legal and regulatory frameworks, assigning responsibility to various actors, 
creating procedures for a broad range of tasks, and establishing the processes for investing in 
renewables (Karatayev et al., 2016). The study showed different actions, achievements and 
gaps when the government designed policy and the governance structure. As the study 
demonstrated, government efforts produced varying results, in the interviewees’ opinions, 
which leads to the conclusion that assessment of these efforts was directly linked to a 
perspective adopted by the interviewees. 
   
Another conclusion is that the government’s own effort, without engaging a broader range of 
actors, appeared insufficient for delivering results in policy design and governance, which 
would satisfy the vast majority of stakeholders. It became particularly evident when the 
government had to make adjustments to governance, which should have been carried out with 
the active engagement of the business community and regional actors (Mouraviev and 
Koulouri, 2018; Naizabekov and Bozhko, 2018). In this situation, it was critical to ensure a 
high degree of involvement of actors in the field, rather than relying primarily on the national 
government’s expertise. However, both agenda-setting (in the form of promoting a society-
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wide discussion and soliciting expert advice from an emerging investors’ community) and 
preference-shaping (in the form of promoting renewable energy as a requirement for ensuring 
tomorrow’s ecological and economic sustainability) were almost imperceptible in the 
government’s efforts. Therefore, renewable energy has not yet become a commonly accepted 
agenda item for interest groups and businesses, and nor has it yet become an established 
preference of consumers (be it organisations or households).       
 
A further conclusion could be drawn in the area of preference-shaping and agenda-setting. It 
is likely that both will become strong influential dimensions of power when the government’s 
and society’s preferences are shared, that is, when the government promotes what society 
accepts and wants and, conversely, when society at large actively supports the government’s 
agenda (Mouraviev and Kakabadse, 2016). This is yet to occur in Kazakhstan regarding 
promotion of renewables.  
 
For 30 years, the government has been focusing on the development of the oil industry, 
which became a dominant sector of the national economy (Koulouri and Mouraviev, 2019). 
When the government adopted laws and regulations aiming to develop renewables, this 
naturally provoked public scepticism that the government might not be sufficiently serious or 
active in their approach to developing the renewable energy industry (Karatayev et al., 2016). 
This was, unfortunately, exacerbated by the scepticism of the investors who faced a large 
number of gaps and inconsistencies in governance, which served as impediments to 
investment. To date, scepticism prevails, as the oil sector’s dominance remains apparent in 
Kazakhstan, and the economy’s dependence on oil and oil revenue continues (Mouraviev and 
Koulouri, 2019). To overcome society’s scepticism, the government should scale up and 
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consolidate its efforts in agenda-setting and shaping preferences for renewables, linking 
increased generation and consumption of renewable energy to the nation’s long-term energy 
security and sustainability, which aligns with the Kazakhstan-2050 strategy (Nazarbayev, 
2012). 
 
5.1 Policy implications  
As different types of influence and efforts were used by the government at varying levels for 
developing the renewables sector, the following two implications for policy can be identified. 
The first is that the government needs to form a policy network. Currently, the government 
continues to adjust governance by making use of its own expertise. However, efforts are 
likely to be more fruitful when they involve investors, business associations, citizens, 
environmental interest groups, community activists, and scientists. This will open the way for 
renewable energy to be included on the agenda at all levels (national, regional, and local) and 
in all parts of the country.  
 
The second policy implication relates to engaging the investor community in improvements 
of governance. This critical factor should be viewed as a separate task, as investors require 
specialised, focused consultations and they need to see evidence that their concerns and 
proposals are taken on board. As development of renewables is dependent on private 
investment, the importance of this policy implication should not be underestimated. For the 
government, its own priorities and resources (e.g. allocation of land plots, keeping the feed-in 
tariff unchanged for a number of years) will have to be balanced with the investors’ needs 
and requirements, which will allow progress to be made in developing energy generation 
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                             Table 1. Power generation in Kazakhstan by source (%) 
 2015 2018 
Fossil fuels 81.6 81.3 
Hydro 10.2 9.7 
Gas turbine 8.0 8.5 
Solar and wind 0.2  0.5* 
Total 100 100 
                        *Solar, wind and bio energy in 2018 
         Source: Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC), 2017 and 2019. 
 
 
Table 2. Study findings: assessment of interviewees’ opinions 
 




Assessment of interviewees’ 
perceptions and opinions  
Policy framework Legal framework for energy 
generation from renewables 
was created, although gaps 
exist.   
Somewhat laudatory remarks 
were available, acknowledging 
government’s effort to design 
policy on renewables as the 
first step. Success of policy 
design was assessed as 
minimal.  
Governance 




Principal elements of the 
governance structure were 
created including the FSC, a 
guide for investors, and 
procedures for granting land. 
There were a number of 
approving comments, going 
with the flow of the 
government’s logic. Most 
interviewees expressed their 
criticism of the incomplete 
governance structure.  
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Investors’ interests were of 
limited importance. A 
mismatch was noted between 
government’s expectations of 
governance and investors’ 
perspective on how their 




perspective on the 
governance 
arrangements  
Governance arrangements left 
considerable gaps, lacking 
procedures and streamlined 
approval processes, and 
showing limited accountability 
of various agencies. The 
incentives to launch renewable 
energy facilities were missing 
for both government officials 
and investors.   
Comments showed many gaps 
and inconsistencies in 
governance. Interviewees 
confirmed that many investors 
walked away due to high 
degree of uncertainty and lack 
of clarity.  
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
